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1THE ESSENTIAL HOLDING OF CASEY: RETHINKING VIABILITY 
Randy Beck* 
“[L]egislatures may draw lines which appear arbitrary 
without the necessity of offering a justification. But courts 
may not. We must justify the lines we draw.” 
 
-Opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter (1992) 1
“You will observe that I have concluded that the end of the 
first trimester is critical. This is arbitrary, but perhaps any 
other selected point, such as quickening or viability, is 
equally arbitrary.” 
 
-Justice Blackmun, Internal Supreme Court Memo (1972)2
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, a three-
Justice plurality of the Supreme Court sought to achieve a lasting 
resolution of the abortion controversy.3 Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and 
Souter authored a joint opinion that recognized a broader scope for state 
regulatory authority, while reaffirming a right to abortion in the “early 
stages” of pregnancy.4 As the Court’s next significant abortion decision 
demonstrated, however, the three Justices who formed the Casey plurality 
had not successfully resolved the abortion issue even among themselves. 
In Stenberg v. Carhart, the proper interpretation of Casey became a matter  
of controversy, leading Justice Kennedy to dissent, while Justices 
O’Connor and Souter joined in striking down Nebraska’s ban on partial-
birth abortions.5
* Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. 
1 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (plurality 
opinion). 
2 Cover Memorandum Accompanying Draft of Roe v. Wade, quoted in DAVID GARROW,
LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 580 (2005). 
3 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
4 Id. at 844, 871-79. 
5 530 U.S. 914 (2000); compare id. at 920-46 (opinion of the Court, joined by Justices 
O’Connor and Souter), and id. at 947-51 (O’Connor, J., concurring), with id. at 956-79 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
2Perhaps it is not surprising that the plurality opinion in Casey, which has 
been understood to express the holding of the case,6 would be interpreted 
in different ways by its joint authors. It is common for people to agree on 
language with legal significance, but to later disagree over its application 
in particular circumstances. Parties to a contract litigate its interpretation. 
Legislators who vote for the same statute dispute its implications. James 
Madison and Alexander Hamilton both participated in the Constitutional 
Convention and collaborated in writing the Federalist Papers, but
afterwards became leaders of competing schools of constitutional 
interpretation.7 The authors of the joint opinion in Casey join a long 
tradition of reaching consensus on a legal formula while understanding the 
formula in different ways. 
 
This paper proposes a reading of the plurality opinion in Casey. The 
suggested interpretation turns on a recognition that the core holding of 
Casey was its reaffirmation of a right to an abortion early in pregnancy.8
Statements in Casey indicating that the abortion right extends to the point 
of fetal viability were dicta, irrelevant to the Court’s resolution of the 
issues presented.9 This article contends that the Court’s identification of 
viability as the earliest point at which states can proscribe abortion has 
never been adequately justified, is not supported by Casey’s stare decisis 
analysis, and interferes with the pursuit of legitimate state interests. 
 
In the interest of full disclosure, let me confess that I have not been a fan 
of the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence. On both constitutional and 
moral grounds, my preference would be for the Court to return the 
abortion issue to the political process, where it can be resolved based on 
the convictions of the American people. But this article is written for those 
who do not agree with me on that point. It addresses those who believe the 
Constitution should be interpreted to safeguard a right to an abortion, but 
 
6 See id. at 921 (drawing applicable legal principles from the Casey joint opinion); id, at 
947 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (treating the Casey plurality opinion as providing the 
controlling legal standards); id. at 960-61 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (drawing from the 
plurality in describing what Casey “held”). 
7 J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002 ILL.
L. REV. 581, 586-98 (2002). 
8 Casey, 505 U.S. at 844 (describing Roe as “holding that the Constitution protects a 
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages”); id. at 850 (recognizing 
disagreement over moral implications of terminating pregnancy “even in its earliest 
stage”); id. at 923 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“In brief, five Members of this Court today 
recognize that ‘the Constitution protects a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in its 
early stages.’"). 
9 See id. at 860, 870-71, 878-79. 
3who are open to the possibility that the Court has been overzealous in 
protecting abortion rights, particularly in cases like Stenberg.
Section I of the article will discuss the joint opinion in Casey, contending 
that the plurality’s statements of adherence to the viability standard 
constituted non-binding dicta, unnecessary to a decision on the questions 
raised.10 The regulations at issue in Casey applied to all abortions, without 
regard to the stage of pregnancy. Section II contends that Casey’s stare 
decisis analysis does not support retention of the viability rule.11 
Assuming that some women have relied on the availability of abortion in 
organizing their personal and professional lives, as the Casey plurality 
believed, that reliance cannot reasonably encompass the viability line. The 
sorts of career and family planning decisions the Casey joint opinion 
emphasized do not depend on a right to abortion that continues well over 
halfway through pregnancy. 
 
Together, sections I and II of the article suggest that the Court should feel 
free to rethink the significance of fetal viability, even if it chooses to retain 
Casey’s “undue burden” formulation. Excising the dicta about viability, 
one can understand Casey to protect a right to terminate a pregnancy in the 
“early stages.”12 Fetal viability need play no role in such an analysis. 
 
The sections that follow make a case for rejecting viability as a legally 
significant line. Section III of the article contends that the Court has never 
adequately justified extension of abortion rights to the point of fetal 
viability, a remarkably late stage in pregnancy when compared to abortion 
laws in other countries.13 As Professor John Hart Ely noted in discussing 
Roe v. Wade’s14 initial adoption of the viability standard: “Exactly why 
that is the magic moment is not made clear. . . . [T]he Court’s defense 
seems to mistake a definition for a syllogism.”15 The theoretical ability of 
the fetus to live outside the mother’s womb turns on factors irrelevant to 
the strength of the state’s interest in preserving life. Moreover, the 
viability standard rests the constitutional status of the fetus on 
characteristics that vary with race and gender. While the Court sometimes 
employs rules that produce unintentional racial and gender disparities, 
there seems no reason to constitutionalize such disparate impacts in the 
absence of a principled justification. 
 
10 See infra notes 17-41 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text. 
12 See supra note 8. 
13 See infra notes 53-118 and accompanying text. 
14 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
15 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, 82 YALE L. J. 920, 924 (1973). 
4The Court’s inability to offer a reasoned defense of the viability standard, 
the moral and constitutional irrelevance of the characteristics it measures 
and the disparate racial and gender impacts that result provide reason 
enough for abandoning the viability rule. Section IV offers an additional 
ground for eliminating the viability standard from the Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence or limiting its application. Specifically, the viability rule 
interferes with the pursuit of the legitimate state interests supporting 
regulation of late-term methods of abortion that even the Justices most 
supportive of abortion rights describe as “gruesome.”16 
I. The Casey Joint Opinion and Its Dicta on Viability 
Many observers expected the Supreme Court’s decision in Casey to 
significantly erode or even end the regime of constitutional abortion rights 
first recognized in Roe v. Wade.17 At the time Casey was decided, at least 
five of the Justices had authored or joined opinions criticizing the Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence.18 Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court’s newest 
member, was not expected to be a strong supporter of abortion rights.19 It 
came as somewhat of a surprise, therefore, when two Justices previously 
 
16 See infra notes 119-43 and accompanying text. 
17 See, e.g., Joseph Kobylka, Will Court Play Politics With Next Abortion Decision?,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, at 25A, 1992 WLNR 4785871 (May 28, 1992) (“Among legal 
scholars and other ‘court watchers,’ the consensus has emerged that the court will uphold 
the state's regulations, but not formally overturn the Roe decision. The death of Roe, they 
say, will occur sometime next year in a case from Guam or Louisiana.”); Mary Deibel, 
Legislatures to Become Front in Abortion War, CINCINNATI POST, at 4K, 1992 WLNR 
581543 (May 21, 1992) (“[T]he nine justices are expected to announce this summer their 
decision in a Pennsylvania case that could further erode the right to abortion. The court 
might not use this case to allow states to ban abortion, but more challenges are on the 
way.”); Nat Hentoff, Pro-Choicers Pin Hopes on Clinton, ROCKY MTN. NEWS 89, 1992 
WLNR 454804 (May 14, 1992) (“It is very likely that in the Pennsylvania case - which 
will be decided in late June or early July - a majority of the court will make clear that 
there is a new standard for judging the right to an abortion. The fundamental 
constitutional right of privacy will be gone. Instead, there will be a lesser standard. What 
the court calls the "rational basis" standard.”). 
18 See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 513-521 (1989) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White and Kennedy, JJ.); id. at 532-37 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747, 786-97 (1986) (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453-59 (1983) (O’Connor, J., joined 
by White and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). 
19 Justice Souter had also joined the Court since the Court’s Webster decision, and his 
views on a constitutional right to abortion were as yet unknown. See Bruce Fein, Onset of 
the Crumbling?, WASHINGTON TIMES, at F1, 1991 WLNR 140397 (Oct. 29, 1991) 
(“Justices David Souter and Clarence Thomas are officially agnostics on Roe, but their 
philosophical instincts and the conservative intellectual gravity of the court's committed 
anti-Roe quartet make them likely coadjutors in a Roe overruling.”). 
5skeptical of Roe helped author the plurality opinion that reaffirmed “the 
essential holding” of that case on stare decisis grounds.20 
While reaffirming what the plurality saw as the core of Roe, the joint 
opinion in Casey altered the Court’s approach to abortion rights in various 
respects. The plurality explicitly abandoned Roe’s “trimester framework,” 
described as “a rigid prohibition on all previability regulation aimed at the 
protection of fetal life.”21 On the contrary, the joint opinion recognized “a 
substantial state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy.”22 From 
the outset of the pregnancy, states could “take measures to ensure that the 
woman’s choice is informed,” so long as those measures were designed to 
“persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion,” and did not 
represent an “undue burden on the right.”23 One aspect of Roe that the 
Casey plurality purported to retain, however, was the Court’s 
identification of viability as the earliest point at which abortion could be 
proscribed: “We conclude the line should be drawn at viability, so that 
before that time the woman has a right to choose to terminate her 
pregnancy.”24 
The Casey plurality reviewed a number of provisions of Pennsylvania law, 
striking down one and upholding the rest. The joint opinion rejected 
challenges directed at Pennsylvania’s definition of medical emergencies 
justifying an immediate abortion,25 its informed consent and waiting 
period provisions requiring the abortionist to furnish certain information to 
the woman at least 24 hours before the abortion,26 its parental consent 
provision,27 and its recordkeeping and reporting requirements.28 At the 
same time, the Court invalidated a provision requiring a married woman to 
notify her husband in most circumstances before obtaining an abortion, 
concluding that the provision created an undue burden for women with 
abusive husbands.29 
20 Casey, 505 U.S. at 845-46. 
21 Id. at 873. The trimester framework did not constitute “part of the essential holding of 
Roe.” Id.
22 Id. at 876. 
23 Id. at 878. 
24 Id. at 870. 
25 Id. at 879-80. 
26 Id. at 881-87. 
27 Id. at 899-900. 
28 Id. at 900-01. 
29 Id. at 887-98. 
6Reflection on the Pennsylvania regulations challenged in Casey leads to 
the conclusion that the plurality’s statements concerning viability were 
dicta, irrelevant to the issues the Court was called upon to decide. 
Comments in an opinion constitute dicta if they are “not essential to [the 
Court’s] disposition of any of the issues contested” in the case.30 The 
provisions of Pennsylvania law at issue in Casey applied throughout 
pregnancy, governing abortions even in the very earliest stages. 
Consequently, nothing in the case required the Court to determine how 
late in pregnancy the right to an abortion continued. Recognition of any 
right to abortion, no matter how long it persisted, would trigger the same 
scrutiny of the Pennsylvania statutory provisions. The question of viability 
vel non did not alter the Court’s analysis of the provisions that were 
upheld, nor of the provision struck down.31 
“Dictum settles nothing, even in the court that utters it.”32 Language that 
constitutes dicta is not binding in subsequent litigation.33 Though an 
earlier Court’s dicta “may be followed if sufficiently persuasive,” they 
“are not controlling.”34 Thus, where the Court articulates a test of 
constitutionality, one element of which constitutes dicta, it may 
nevertheless “correct course” in a subsequent case involving application of 
the test.35 
30 Central Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 431 (2001). 
31 In my view, one may reasonably argue that the viability line constituted dicta even in 
its original context in Roe v. Wade, since it was unnecessary to the Court’s invalidation of 
the Texas abortion statute. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 
521 (1989) (plurality) (“In Roe . . . the Texas statute criminalized the performance of all 
abortions, except when the mother’s life was at stake. . . . This case therefore affords us 
no occasion to revisit the holding of Roe, which was that the Texas statute 
unconstitutionally infringed the right to an abortion derived from the Due Process Clause 
. . . and we leave it undisturbed. To the extent indicated in our opinion, we would modify 
and narrow Roe and succeeding cases.”); Michael Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA.
L. REV. 1997, 2007-09 (1994) (explaining the Webster plurality’s analysis of the holding 
in Roe); but see id. at 2030-2040 (discussing Roe in concluding that the holding of a case 
includes the rationale for the decision, not just the facts and outcome); Michael 
Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1078-84 (2005) 
(arguing that Roe’s discussion of permissible abortion regulations in the first two 
trimesters should be deemed holding). 
32 Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 351 n.12 (2005). 
33 Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 235 (1959) (“But that language 
is in dicta and is neither binding nor persuasive.”); see also Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. 
Ct. 2159, 2163-64 (2006) (Court “had long since rejected” approach to exclusionary rule 
suggested by “[e]xpansive dicta” in earlier opinion); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court 
of Nevada, Humboldt, 542 U.S. 177, 186-87 (2004) (prior dicta did not resolve question 
whether state could compel suspect to disclose name during Terry stop). 
34 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935). 
35 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546, 548 (2005). 
7In Cohens v. Virginia, Chief Justice Marshall offered a now-classic 
rationale for denying controlling weight to dicta in a prior case: 
 
The question actually before the Court is investigated with 
care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles 
which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their 
relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on 
all other cases is seldom completely investigated.36 
In other words, the distinction between holding and dicta recognizes the 
limits of judicial foresight. Judges tend to be bright people, but their 
decisions inevitably produce consequences in subsequent cases that they 
did not fully anticipate. This is true in part because parties have little 
incentive to brief issues tangential to the case under consideration. Judicial 
statements regarding issues actually raised in litigation, by contrast, are 
more reliable because they are more likely to be informed by extensive 
adversarial briefing.37 
These considerations support treating Casey’s discussion of viability as 
dicta. It seems doubtful that the Justices in the Casey plurality were fully 
cognizant of future cases like Stenberg when they drafted the joint 
opinion. Moreover, since viability was not relevant to the constitutionality 
of the challenged Pennsylvania regulations, potential justifications for the 
viability rule played no more than a de minimis role in the parties’ briefs.38 
This may explain why, as we will see below, Casey’s joint opinion offered 
no substantive rationale for adhering to viability as the point at which 
states may proscribe abortions.39 Nor, apart from a single footnote dropped 
 
36 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821). See Dorf, supra note 30, 
at 2000 (“Chief Justice Marshall provides an instrumental justification for the maxim that 
dicta need not be followed. Dicta are less carefully considered than holding, and, 
therefore, less likely to be accurate statements of law.”); Abramowicz & Stearns, supra 
note 30, at 1022-23 (“The holding-dicta distinction, properly conceived, helps to enforce 
an appropriate level of consideration, one that delves into reconciling the immediate case 
with the larger body of precedent, but that does not necessarily look for, or attempt to 
resolve, fissures within larger bodies of case law, at least at one time. Judicial 
minimalism leaves important issues open for resolution after further democratic 
deliberation.”). 
37 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 572 
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Sound judicial 
decisionmaking requires ‘both a vigorous prosecution and a vigorous defense’ of the 
issues in dispute, . . . and a constitutional rule announced sua sponte is entitled to less 
deference than one addressed on full briefing and argument.”) (quoting Christiansburg 
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419 (1978)); Dorf, supra note 30, at 2002. 
38 See Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents, at 28, 1992 WL 12006398 (Mar. 6, 
1992); Brief for Respondents 1992 WL 551421, at 111-12 (Mar. 6, 1992); Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 16-17, 1992 WL 12006421 
(Apr. 6, 1992). 
39 See infra notes 66-69 and 114 and accompanying text. 
8by Justice Scalia, did the dissenters engage the plurality on this aspect of 
the joint opinion.40 The Casey plurality’s purported reaffirmation of the 
viability line presents an appropriate instance for the principle that the 
Court is “not bound to follow . . . dicta in a prior case in which the 
point . . . at issue was not fully debated.”41 
II. Casey’s Stare Decisis Analysis and the Viability Rule 
The Casey joint opinion premised its partial reaffirmation of Roe on the 
principle of stare decisis.42 In the course of its stare decisis analysis, the 
Court focused on two harms it believed would flow from overruling Roe.
First, the plurality thought that many women had come to rely on a right to 
abortion as the basis for significant personal decisions, and that these 
reliance interests would be undermined by abandonment of the Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence.43 Second, the authors of the joint opinion feared 
that the Court’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public would be adversely 
affected if it overruled Roe in the face of persistent opposition.44 Both 
points were strongly contested in the dissenting opinions.45 For present 
purposes, however, it is enough to show that neither argument supports 
continued adherence to the viability line. 
 
The Casey plurality discussed the reliance engendered by Roe in the 
following passage: 
 
40 Justice Scalia’s principal point was that adherence to the viability standard was 
inconsistent with Justice O’Connor’s previous critique of that standard as “arbitrary.” See 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 989 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting)). In a footnote, Justice Scalia commented as follows: 
Of course, Justice O’Connor was correct in her former view. The 
arbitrariness of the viability line is confirmed by the Court’s inability to 
offer any justification for it beyond the conclusory assertion that it is 
only at that point that the unborn child’s life “can in reason and all 
fairness” be thought to override the interests of the mother. Precisely 
why is it that, at the magical second when machines currently in use 
(though not necessarily available to the particular woman) are able to 
keep an unborn child alive apart from its mother, the creature is 
suddenly able (under our Constitution) to be protected by law, whereas 
before that magical second it was not? That make no more sense than 
according infants legal protection only after the point when they can 
feed themselves. 
Id. at 989 n.5. 
41 See Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 996 (2006). 
42 Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-69. 
43 Id. at 855-56. 
44 Id. at 861-69. 
45 Casey, 505 U.S. at 956-64 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
id. at 996-1001 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
9[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, 
people have organized intimate relationships and made 
choices that define their views of themselves and their 
places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion 
in the event that contraception should fail. The ability of 
women to participate equally in the economic and social 
life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to 
control their reproductive lives.46 
Assuming the validity of the plurality’s analysis here, the argument does 
not support retention of viability as the terminal point for a constitutional 
right to abortion. While some women may make career and relationship 
decisions on the assumption that they can obtain an abortion, it would be 
difficult to make the case that women have “relied reasonably on the . . . 
continued application” of the viability rule.47 It is implausible that such 
personal and professional decisions rest on the assumption that the 
opportunity to obtain an abortion will remain available for more than five 
months after pregnancy begins. Whatever reasonable reliance interests 
exist in this context can be fully vindicated through an abortion right that 
ends well before the point of viability. The ability of women to “control 
their reproductive lives” can co-exist comfortably with a state’s insistence 
that the woman exercise that control early in the process of gestation, long 
before fetal viability. 
 
As to the question of legitimacy, the joint opinion in Casey suggests that 
this concern would be implicated only if the Court overruled Roe outright, 
not if it merely adjusted the subsidiary rules through which the abortion 
right has been administered.48 The plurality itself rejected Roe’s trimester 
framework, adopting instead an undue burden test, and overruled two 
post-Roe decisions that had placed excessive impediments in the way of 
legitimate state regulations, all without any apparent concern for 
institutional legitimacy.49 Taken as a whole, then, the joint opinion shows 
 
46 505 U.S. at 856. 
47 Id. at 855. 
48 This has never seemed to me a strong argument in favor of the plurality’s stare decisis 
analysis. While there were no doubt segments of the public who saw the Court as more 
legitimate because it resisted the pressure to overrule Roe, I suspect there were groups of 
equal size whose respect for the Court diminished because of its unwillingness to 
reconsider a decision so difficult to justify in terms of constitutional text, history and 
tradition. Stubbornly clinging to a bad precedent can adversely impact the Court’s 
perceived legitimacy as much as overruling under political pressure. Cf. Casey, 505 U.S. 
at 963-64 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 999 (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
49 Id. at 872-79 (rejecting trimester framework and explaining undue burden test); id. at 
882 (partially overruling Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 
10 
that the plurality’s concern for the Court’s perceived legitimacy does not 
play a decisive role in stare decisis analysis so long as the Court leaves in 
place a basic right to abortion derived from Roe.50 
Section I argued that Casey’s discussion of viability constituted dicta on 
an issue that was not raised in the case and had not been the subject of 
plenary briefing.51 This section contends that reconsideration of the 
constitutional significance of fetal viability would comport with the Casey 
plurality’s stare decisis analysis. Rethinking the viability line would be 
analogous to reexamining the trimester framework, which once included 
viability as a constituent part.52 The Court should therefore feel free to 
revisit the viability standard in an appropriate case. The next section will 
argue that the Court has never offered an adequate explanation for the 
viability rule first adopted in Roe.
III. The Persistent Failure to Justify the Viability Rule 
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have generated much discussion of 
whether a judge may appropriately take foreign law into account in 
resolving questions under the United States Constitution.53 In Roper v. 
 
416 (1983) and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747 (1986)). 
50 In any event, there seem to me reasons to question the premise that stare decisis rules 
apply the same here as in other contexts. Such a position ignores the weightiness of the 
interests at stake in the abortion controversy. If anything, perhaps the Court should be 
less wedded to its prior precedents when human lives may be on the line. In the context 
of capital punishment, the Court has sometimes said that “death is different,” suggesting 
that courts should take greater care to ensure the legality of their judgments and the 
fairness of their procedures when human lives are at issue. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584, 605-06 (2002); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). With respect to its abortion jurisprudence, the Court has 
professed agnosticism in the face of claims that the unborn fetus is a human life prior to 
the point of viability. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. Consequently, Roe and its progeny have 
erected a set of constitutional rules authorizing the death of beings that, for all the Court 
knows, may have a moral entitlement to continue living as great as that of any adult 
human being. Given that adherence to the viability rule may result in the unjustified 
deaths of thousands of human persons annually, it would seem reasonable for the Court 
to show greater willingness to reexamine the premises underlying its constitutional 
analysis in this context than when it is asked to revisit some decision affecting less 
significant interests. 
51 See supra notes 17-41 and accompanying text. 
52 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872 (under Roe’s trimester framework, “during the third 
trimester, when the fetus is viable, prohibitions are permitted provided the life or health 
of the mother is not at stake”). 
53 See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, International Law and Rehnquist-Era Reversals, 94 
GEO. L.J. 1319 (2006); Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic 
Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69 (2004); Daniel 
Bodansky, The Use of International Sources in Constitutional Opinion, 32 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 421 (2004). 
11 
Simmons, for instance, in concluding that the death penalty may not be 
applied to a person below the age of 18 at the time of the murder, the 
Court observed that only a small number of countries permit capital 
sentences in those circumstances.54 In his Roper dissent, Justice Scalia 
accused the Court of being selective in its invocation of foreign law, 
pointing to the Court’s abortion jurisprudence as an example. The United 
States, he argued, is “one of only six countries that allow abortion on 
demand until the point of viability.”55 An article cited by Justice Scalia 
provides additional data on abortion laws worldwide: 
 
The vast majority of the world’s countries (187 of 195) 
forbid abortion after 12 weeks gestation, and require, at a 
minimum, that the pregnant woman make some showing of 
“good reason” to terminate a pregnancy (141 of 195). 
Indeed, half the countries of the world (98 of 195) either 
forbid abortion altogether or allow abortions only to save 
the woman’s life or physical health, or in cases of rape or 
incest. World opinion on abortion thus appears much more 
restrictive of abortion rights than domestic constitutional 
law.56 
Professor Mary Ann Glendon notes that “no Continental [European] 
country permits abortion on demand as far into pregnancy as does the 
United States.”57 
54 543 U.S. 551, 575-79 (2005); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003) 
(discussing European precedent in concluding United States Constitution prohibits 
criminalization of consensual homosexual conduct); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 
n.21 (2002) (“within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes 
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved”). 
55 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 625 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia has 
repeatedly criticized the practice of relying on foreign precedent in resolving 
constitutional issues. See The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. 
Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice 
Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 521-22 (2005). 
56 Joan L. Larson, Importing Constitutional Norms from a ‘Wider Civilization’: Lawrence 
and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic 
Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1320 (2004). 
57 Mary Ann Glendon, A Beau Mentir Qui Vient de Loin: The 1988 Canadian Abortion 
Decision in Comparative Perspective, 83 NW. U.L. REV. 569, 582 (1989) (“[N]o 
Continental [European] country has a total ban on abortion; but no Continental country 
permits abortion on demand as far into pregnancy as does the United States.”); see also 
Mary Ann Glendon, Foundations of Human Rights: The Unfinished Business, 44 AM. J. 
JURIS. 1, 10 (1999) (“few countries, if any, go as far as the United States and China in 
permitting abortions of healthy, viable unborn children”); Kenneth Anderson, Squaring 
the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance Through Global 
Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1287 n.51 (2005) (“[W]hen measured 
against secular Western European legal norms—let alone those of the rest of the world, 
including the Muslim and Latin American worlds—the standard of Roe v. Wade is just as 
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In highlighting these differences between U.S. abortion law and that of 
other countries, I do not intend to weigh in on the debate about the Court’s 
reliance on foreign law. Rather, I do so simply as a way of framing the 
question addressed in this section of the article: What is the justification 
for rejecting any significant regulatory constraint on taking the life of a 
fetus prior to the point that the fetus could survive outside the womb? If 
other nations generally conclude that abortion rights should not extend so 
far into pregnancy, what explains the Supreme Court’s insistence on such 
a permissive line? 
A. The Court’s “Explanations” of the Viability Line 
 
A draft of the opinion in Roe, circulated by Justice Blackmun following 
reargument of the case in 1972, would have protected abortion on demand 
only until the end of the first trimester, permitting states to require a 
therapeutic justification for any abortion thereafter.58 In a memorandum 
accompanying that draft, Justice Blackmun made the observations quoted 
at the outset of this article. He noted that selection of the end of the first 
trimester as the legally relevant point “is arbitrary, but perhaps any other 
selected point, such as quickening or viability, is equally arbitrary.”59 
Following further internal deliberations, the majority switched to viability 
as the point at which states could regulate to protect the life of the fetus, 
adopting a position previously suggested by then-District Court Judge Jon 
O. Newman.60 
The Roe opinion discussed the significance of viability in the following 
passage: 
 
much an ‘outlier’; Western Europe, while permitting abortion, has imposed many 
intermediate requirements that have been struck down in the United States.”) (citing 
MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN 
FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 15-24 (1987)). 
58 GARROW, supra note 1, at 580-81 (“During the first three months, Blackmun’s opinion 
held, a state ‘must do no more than to leave the abortion decision to the best medical 
judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.’ However, ‘For the stage 
subsequent to the first trimester, the State may, if it chooses, determine a point beyond 
which it restricts legal abortions to stated reasonable therapeutic categores that are 
articulated with sufficient clarity so that a physician is able to predict what conditions fall 
within the stated classifications.’”); see also David Garrow, Roe v. Wade Revisited, 9
GREEN BAG 71, 79 (2005) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, ED., ET AL, WHAT ROE V. WADE 
SHOULD HAVE SAID (2005)). 
59 Cover Memorandum Accompanying Draft of Roe v. Wade, quoted in DAVID GARROW,
LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 580 (2005). 
60 See Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 232 (D. Conn. 1972); GARROW, supra note 1, 
at 580-86. 
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With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest 
in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This 
is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability 
of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb. State 
regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has 
both logical and biological justifications.61 
It was this discussion that gave rise to Professor Ely’s comment that the 
Court “seems to mistake a definition for a syllogism.”62 While the word 
“because” leads the reader to expect a rationale for selecting viability as 
the controlling line, the remainder of the sentence disappoints that 
expectation, simply rephrasing the Court’s earlier explanation of what 
viability means.63 The Court alludes to “logical and biological 
justifications” in the sentence that follows, but these are nowhere spelled 
out in the opinion. 
 
A standard critique of the viability rule has been that it attributes 
constitutional significance to a line that can change over time, depending 
on the current state of medical technology.64 Others, however, have 
offered a more profound critique. While the Court has treated viability as a 
tipping point, at which the state interest in protecting fetal life becomes 
sufficiently compelling to outweigh the mother’s interest in ending the 
pregnancy, there is no obvious sense in which the fact of fetal viability 
 
61 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). The opinion subjected postviability abortion 
restrictions to a substantial qualification: “If the State is interested in protecting fetal life 
after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it 
is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.” Id. (emphasis added). In Doe v. 
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the companion case to Roe, the Court treated the idea of 
maternal “health” expansively, noting that “the medical judgment may be exercised in 
light of all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—
relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health” Id. at 192. 
This broad understanding of the factors an abortion provider can take into consideration 
in concluding that a third-trimester abortion will benefit the mother’s “health” has led 
some to conclude that the Court’s exception effectively swallows the rule allowing states 
to ban abortions after viability. See RAMESH PONNURU, PARTY OF DEATH 9-10 (2006). 
62 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, 82 YALE L. J. 920, 924 (1973). 
63 Compare Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (“Physicians and their scientific colleagues have 
regarded [quickening] with less interest and have tended to focus either upon conception, 
upon live birth, or upon the interim point at which the fetus becomes ‘viable,’ that is, 
potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid. Viability is 
usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 
weeks.”). 
64 See City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 456 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Just as improvements 
in medical technology inevitably will move forward the point at which the State may 
regulate for reasons of maternal health, different technological improvements will move 
backward the point of viability at which the State may proscribe abortions except when 
necessary to preserve the life and health of the mother.”). 
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causes the state’s interest in the life of the unborn to weigh more than it 
did before.65 
The Casey plurality had an opportunity to supply Roe’s omitted 
justification for the viability standard, but the joint opinion did not rise to 
the challenge. The plurality offered two reasons for retaining the viability 
rule. The first was the principle of stare decisis. The plurality noted that 
“[a]ny judicial act of line-drawing may seem somewhat arbitrary, but Roe 
was a reasoned statement, elaborated with great care.”66 This description 
of Roe completely overlooked Professor Ely’s still unanswered critique. 
Whatever the merits of Roe in other respects, its adoption of viability as 
the controlling line was not “a reasoned statement, elaborated with great 
care.” 
 
The second rationale offered by the Casey joint opinion effectively 
compounded the problem, succumbing to the same definition/syllogism 
confusion that afflicted the opinion in Roe:
[T]he concept of viability, as we noted in Roe, is the time at 
which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and 
nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent 
existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be 
the object of state protection that now overrides the rights 
of the woman. Consistent with other constitutional norms, 
legislatures may draw lines which appear arbitrary without 
the necessity of offering a justification. But courts may not. 
We must justify the lines we draw. And there is no line 
other than viability which is more workable.67 
While acknowledging the Court’s obligation to justify the viability line, 
the plurality failed to do so. References to “reason” and “fairness” are just 
rhetorical flourishes in the absence of a principled explanation of why the 
“possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb” 
changes the strength of the state interest in a way that causes it to 
outweigh the interest of the mother. The conclusion that no other line “is 
more workable” does nothing to show that the viability line satisfies the 
call for principled justification. 
 
65 See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 795 (White, J., dissenting); Mark J. Beutler, Comment, 
Abortion and the Viability Standard—Toward a More Reasoned Determination of the 
State’s Countervailing Interest in Protecting Prenatal Life, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 347, 
360 (1991) (“The point of viability says much about medical technology, little about 
fetuses, and has no apparent logical connection to the two interests which compete in the 
abortion equation—the woman’s autonomy interest and the intrinsic worth of the fetus.”). 
66 Casey, 505 U.S. at 870. 
67 Id. (citation omitted). 
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The real problem, in my view, is that Justice Blackmun was correct in his 
initial assessment, when he candidly conceded the possibility that it would 
be “equally arbitrary” to terminate the abortion right at the end of the first 
trimester or at viability.68 Justice White challenged the justification for the 
viability standard in a subsequent dissent, arguing that “the Court’s choice 
of viability as the point at which the State’s interest becomes compelling is 
entirely arbitrary.”69 The subsections that follow consider and reject three 
possible explanations for the viability standard, drawn from Roe, Casey 
and Judge Newman’s opinion first suggesting the viability standard. The 
inadequacy of these three rationales shows that the Supreme Court has 
failed to offer a principled defense of viability as the controlling line. 
B. Dependent Beings as Unworthy of Protection 
The point of viability marks a theoretical transition from dependence to 
autonomy.70 Before viability, the fetus cannot survive without the support 
of the mother. After viability, the fetus potentially can survive apart from 
the mother, at least with appropriate technological assistance. Thus, after 
viability, the fetus can be described as possessing a form of autonomy or 
independence it did not possess beforehand.71 So long as the fetus remains 
in the mother’s womb, of course, this autonomy is hypothetical, rather 
than actual.72 The conclusion that a fetus is viable is not a description of 
an existing state of affairs, so much as a medical prediction of what might 
happen in circumstances that do not then exist.73 
The Roe Court concluded that the form of theoretical autonomy denoted 
by the term “viability” plays a decisive role in transforming the character 
of a state’s interest in preserving the life of the unborn. At this point, Roe 
indicated, the state’s interest in what the Court called “potential life” 
 
68 See supra text accompanying note 59. 
69 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 
794 (1986) (White, J., dissenting). 
70 Donald Hope, The Hand as Emblem of Human Identity: A Solution to the Abortion 
Controversy Based on Science and Reason, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 205, 212 (2001) (“[A]s 
long as the fetus is dependent and vulnerable, it can be destroyed and only earns the right 
to legal protection when it passes the point of a hypothetical independence.”). 
71 Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (viability “is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of 
maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of 
the second life” can receive state protection) (emphasis added). 
72 Hope, supra note 70, at 208 (“The viability standard stands for the curious notion that 
all those who need the life support of gestation may be terminated at will, while for those 
who can survive without gestation, gestation can be mandated.”). 
73 Id. at 211 (“Viability is a prediction about survivability, based on assessment of fetal 
lung maturity. As such, it must be estimated from other developmental features and is not 
directly observable.”). 
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suddenly becomes strong enough to count as “compelling.”74 The 
implication is that some significant change occurs in the fetus at the time 
when ex utero survival becomes possible, a change that suddenly shifts the 
balance in the state’s favor. 
 
In a dissenting opinion authored thirteen years after Roe, Justice White 
questioned the justification for the viability standard, offering a critique 
that the Court has not successfully answered to this day. Justice White 
began with facts about fetal development that cannot reasonably be 
denied: “the fetus is an entity that bears in its cells all the genetic 
information that characterizes a member of the species homo sapiens and 
distinguishes an individual member of that species from all others.”75 He 
could see no morally or constitutionally significant change in the fetus at 
viability that would affect the strength of the relevant state interest: 
 
The governmental interest at issue is in protecting those 
who will be citizens if their lives are not ended in the 
womb. The substantiality of this interest is in no way 
dependent on the probability that the fetus may be capable 
of surviving outside the womb at any given point in its 
development, as the possibility of survival is contingent on 
the state of medical practice and technology, factors that 
are in essence morally and constitutionally irrelevant. The 
State’s interest is in the fetus as an entity in itself, and the 
character of this entity does not change at the point of 
viability under conventional medical wisdom. Accordingly, 
the State’s interest, if compelling after viability, is equally 
compelling before viability.76 
To answer Justice White’s argument and satisfy its obligation of reasoned 
decisionmaking, the Court must show that the conditions leading to a 
finding of viability bear in some significant respect, legally or morally, on 
the strength of the state’s interest in unborn life. 
 
The Court could try to meet Justice White’s challenge by reference to 
some legal or philosophical understanding of personhood. One might 
argue that the theoretical autonomy associated with viability serves as a 
trigger point—a sort of moral on-off switch—changing what was 
 
74 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. The phrase “potential life” is a euphemism. No one really denies 
that the unborn human is alive as a biological matter before an abortion. See PONNURU,
supra note 61, at 78 (an embryo “is alive rather than dead or inanimate. It is human rather 
than a member of some other species.”). The question is the strength of the state’s interest 
in preserving the actual life of the fetus, not its “potential” life. 
75 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 792 (White, J., dissenting). 
76 Id. at 795. 
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previously just a developing mass of cells into a “person” or “human life” 
entitled to government protection. Professor Michael Anthony Lewis 
appears to embrace such an argument in an article discussing “freedom of 
autonomy,” a concept he deems morally fundamental: “For freedom of 
autonomy purposes the fetus is a person at the point of viability, and the 
state is justified in prohibiting abortion to protect that person’s right to be 
left alone to live, subject to the usual exceptions for mother’s health and 
other extenuating circumstances.”77 
A claim of this sort about viability, however, seems impossible to 
reconcile with an earlier portion of the Roe opinion. The Court denied that 
judges have the capacity to determine the point at which “life” begins 
from a moral standpoint: 
 
Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, 
life begins at conception and is present throughout 
pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling 
interest in protecting that life from and after conception. 
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life 
begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of 
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at 
any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the 
development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to 
speculate as to the answer.78 
The Court displays a commendable humility in this passage. The members 
of the Supreme Court are generalists. They possess no particular expertise 
in addressing moral questions such as those that underlie a case like Roe.
In addition to taking the Court beyond its competence, denying that a 
previable fetus counts as a human life would also create tension with the 
Casey Court’s recognition of a legitimate state interest in preserving the 
life of the fetus from the beginning of pregnancy. The plurality 
acknowledged “that the State has [a] legitimate interest[] from the outset 
of the pregnancy in protecting . . . the life of the fetus,” albeit an interest 
that before viability is “not strong enough to support a prohibition of 
 
77 Michael Anthony Lewis, Reviving a Natural Right: The Freedom of Autonomy, 42 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 123, 159 (2006). Note that the term “person” is used in different 
senses, depending on context. The Roe Court denied that a fetus constitutes a “person” as 
that term is used in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Framers, in the Court’s view, used 
the term “person” to refer to those who had already been born. In Professor Lewis’ 
argument, by contrast, the term “person” denotes a moral category, not a constitutional 
one. Even if the Framers for constitutional purposes used the term “person” to refer to 
postnatal humans, that does not foreclose the possibility that some or all prenatal humans 
might be “persons” for moral purposes. 
78 Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. 
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abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s 
effective right to elect the procedure.”79 
While the Court cannot take up the argument that viability represents the 
sine qua non of human personhood, perhaps it could offer a somewhat 
different moral argument. One might view the moral entitlement of the 
fetus as something that increases over time as a consequence of various 
capacities that emerge in the process of fetal development. This would be 
consistent with the Court’s statement in Roe that the state’s legitimate 
interest in fetal life “grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term 
and, at a point during pregnancy, . . . becomes ‘compelling.’”80 It would 
also be consistent with the Casey plurality’s recognition of a state interest 
in fetal life that comes into existence at the beginning of pregnancy, but 
only becomes sufficiently powerful to warrant a prohibition of abortion 
after viability. In this framework, the theoretical autonomy denoted by the 
term “viability” is a morally significant fact about the fetus—not the only 
morally significant fact, perhaps, but one without which the fetus lacks an 
entitlement to life that the state can protect. Thus, the authors of the Casey 
joint opinion contended that the “realistic possibility of maintaining and 
nourishing a life outside the womb” after viability corresponds to “the 
independent existence of [a] second life” that “can in reason and all 
fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights of 
the woman.”81 
While one can more easily reconcile this sliding scale theory of fetal 
entitlement with the language of Roe and Casey, it is not clear why the 
contested moral questions in this context would be any less difficult than 
the question of “when life begins,” which the Roe Court thought itself 
incapable of resolving.82 The theory that moral entitlements are connected 
to our emerging capacities presents a highly controversial claim as a 
philosophical matter.83 And even if the theory enjoyed broad support at 
some high level of generality, one nevertheless suspects that “those trained 
in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology” would 
reach divergent conclusions regarding the moral weight that should attach 
to the emergence of any particular capacity.84 
79 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
80 Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63. 
81 Casey, 505 U.S. at 870. 
82 Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. 
83 See, e.g., PONNURU, supra note 61, at 127, 175-79; Robert P. George, Terri Schiavo: A 
Right to Life Denied or a Right to Die Honored?, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 419, 419-22 
(2006). 
84 Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. 
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More particularly, the Court needs to show that the moral entitlement of 
the fetus (and hence the state interest in protecting the fetus) becomes 
significantly stronger once the fetus crosses the threshold of viability. But 
here the Court must deal with Justice White’s contention that the viability 
of a particular fetus turns on “factors that are in essence morally and 
constitutionally irrelevant.”85 There is no difference in kind between the 
pre-viable and post-viable fetus, merely a difference in the degree of 
development. While the fetus can be said to possess (at least theoretically) 
a new form of autonomy or independence at viability, it is not clear why 
this attribute carries the decisive moral weight attributed to it by the Court. 
 
The law does not generally require autonomy or independence as a 
condition for the existence of enforceable legal rights and interests. In 
many contexts, we deem physical dependence compatible with legal 
independence. In cases concerning medical treatment, for instance, our 
laws often recognize comatose or otherwise incompetent patients as 
continuing to possess rights or interests that may be asserted in litigation 
and protected by the state.86 As Justice Kennedy noted in Stenberg, a state 
is properly concerned with “the dignity and value of human life, even life 
which cannot survive without the assistance of others.”87 
In some contexts, indeed, it is the very fact of dependence—the absence of 
autonomy—that brings legal rights into existence. The prisoner or 
institutionalized person has claims against the state that could not be 
asserted if the individual could provide for himself; it is only his 
dependence that gives him a cause of action.88 A young child has a right to 
support and maintenance from her parents precisely because the law 
 
85 Id. at 795. 
86 See, e.g., David M. English, The Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act and Its Progress 
in the States, PROBATE AND PROPERTY 19 (May/June 2001) (“Most states recognize 
living wills, powers of attorneys for health care and a decision making role for the 
families of those who have failed to make advance directives.”); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 
10, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
87 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 962 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
88 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (“An inmate must rely on prison 
authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not 
be met.”); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-
200 (1989) (“when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against 
his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some 
responsibility for his safety and general well-being”); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 
307, 317 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized—and wholly dependent on the 
State—it is conceded by petitioners that a duty to provide certain services and care does 
exist, although even then a State necessarily has considerable discretion in determining 
the nature and scope of its responsibilities.”). 
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recognizes her dependence on them as an attribute calling for state 
protection.89 
Even if we deemed some form of autonomy relevant to the status of the 
fetus, however, the Court has nowhere explained why the particular form 
associated with viability is legally or morally controlling. “Autonomy” or 
“independence” is not a single, unvariable condition. It is a continuum, a 
matter of degree. We all depend on others for the fulfillment of various 
needs. Every time we walk into a grocery store, check into a hospital, fill a 
prescription, or call the electric company to report an interruption of 
service, we implicitly recognize various forms of dependence on others, 
some of which may be critical to survival. 
 
An important form of autonomy comes into existence very early in 
development, with the creation of an embryo genetically independent of 
its mother.90 A different form of autonomy commences when the heartbeat 
begins, another when the embryo becomes a fetus with a functioning brain 
and the capacity for independent movement,91 another at the point of birth, 
another when the child can walk, another when it can fix its own meals 
and still another when it gets a driver’s license. The autonomy associated 
with the medical concept of viability seems less significant, as a practical 
matter, than many of these other forms because it is merely theoretical.92 
Viability is just a probability, a prediction of what doctors think could 
 
89 See 67A CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, Parent and Child § 156 (2006) (“The duty of 
parents to provide necessary support and maintenance may be said to rest on the inability 
of children to care for themselves. . . .”); Liability of Parent for Necessaries Furnished to 
Adult Child, 42 A.L.R. 150 (1926) (“The general rules of the law of parent and child, 
being based on the child's incapacity, both natural and legal, and its consequent need of 
protection and care, apply only while the child is under the age of majority, and the 
father's legal duty to support his child ceases when the child comes of age, although it 
continues to reside in his family.”). 
90 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 792 (White, J., dissenting). 
91 About eight weeks after conception, at the transition from embryo to fetus, “the brain 
first begins to show electrical activity that is measurable by EEG.” Hope, supra note 70, 
at 216. “It is at this stage of development that movement, first reflexive and then 
spontaneous, appears.” Id. at 217. 
92 Here lies the problem with the Casey plurality’s description of viability as the point 
when “the independent existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the 
object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the woman.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 
870. The Court cannot mean that there was no “independent existence” of a “second life” 
before the point of viability. It is indisputable that there was a second life before viability 
that was independent genetically, that had its own heartbeat and brainwaves and that 
could move independently of the mother. The Court does nothing to enlighten us as to 
why it believes that only the emergence of the particular form of independence associated 
with viability tips the balance in favor of the state. 
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happen under a set of conditions different than those that in fact exist.93 It 
brings about no real alteration in the life of either the fetus or the mother.94 
Justice White found viability “morally and constitutionally irrelevant” 
because it “is contingent on the state of medical practice and 
technology.”95 As a consequence of this technological dependence, the 
constitutional status of a fetus can depend on the year in which it was 
conceived, rather than any characteristic of the fetus itself. The Casey 
plurality was untroubled by the question “whether viability occurs at 
approximately 28 weeks, as was usual at the time of Roe, at 23 to 24 
weeks, as it sometimes does today, or at some moment even slightly 
earlier in pregnancy, as it may if fetal respiratory capacity can somehow 
be enhanced in the future.”96 But the result of this malleable standard is 
that a state in 1973 probably lacked authority to protect, say, a 26-week-
old fetus, while the very same fetus could be afforded legal protection 
today. By the same token, it seems a logical consequence of the Court’s 
reasoning that fetuses in rural areas enjoy less potential for legal 
protection than those in cities with state-of-the-art neonatal facilities.97 
The long-noted moral randomness of the viability standard ultimately 
shades into moral perversity. The medical evidence shows that viability 
tends to occur at different points in development, depending on the race, 
ethnicity and gender of the fetus.98 A recently published study of 
extremely low birth weight (ELBW) infants, for instance, shows 
significantly greater prospects for survival among female and African-
American fetuses: 
 
Female survival rates were higher than male survival rates 
in all 3 gestational age curves and across the entire range of 
birth weights. Black survival rates were always higher than 
white survival rates. In addition, the effect of female gender 
on survival rates seemed larger than the effect of black 
 
93 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
94 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
95 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 795 (White, J., dissenting). 
96 Casey, 505 U.S. at 860; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (viability “is usually placed at 
about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks”). 
97 See Hope, supra note 70, at 211 (“Viability actually becomes a vague marker if we ask 
whether we mean viability in an advanced neonatal ICU or viability in a remote rural 
county with limited medical resources.”). 
98 Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Neonatal Mortality—United States, 1989-2001, 292 
J. AMER. MED. ASS’N 2461 (2004); Greg R. Alexander et al., US Birth 
Weight/Gestational Age-Specific Neonatal Mortality: 1995-1997 Rates for Whites, 
Hispanics, and Blacks, 111 PEDIATRICS 61 (2003). 
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race. Both race and gender effects became more distinct at 
lower weights and gestational ages.99 
The Supreme Court, in other words, has constitutionalized a standard with 
disparate impacts based on race and gender. As a corollary, since it takes 
longer for a white fetus to reach viability, the right to an abortion under 
the Roe/Casey framework tends to last longer for white women than for 
African-Americans. 
 
I certainly do not believe the Supreme Court was aware of these racial and 
gender disparities when it adopted the viability standard. But I do believe 
these disparate impacts underscore the Court’s obligation to either justify 
or abandon the viability rule. When faced with a practice that produces 
disparate impacts for a protected class, a common judicial response has 
been to examine the adequacy of the reasons offered for the practice in 
question.100 We sometimes tolerate racial and gender disparities when they 
are the unintentional consequence of a rule justified on other grounds, but 
there is no reason for tolerance when the rule itself lacks a principled 
justification. 
 
Neither Roe nor the cases that followed have offered a theory of human 
rights or fetal entitlements that would explain the decisive role attributed 
to viability in the context of abortion regulation. Such a theory seems an 
indispensable element for the Court to satisfy its admitted obligation to 
“justify the lines we draw.”101 For the sake of completeness, however, we 
will consider below two other judicial arguments in support of the 
viability standard that are not necessarily premised on the idea that a 
morally or constitutionally significant change occurs in the fetus as it 
crosses the viability threshold. 
C. Presumed Societal Consensus at Viability 
The idea of treating viability as the controlling constitutional line did not 
originate with the Supreme Court in Roe. The Court borrowed the concept 
from dicta in Judge Newman’s opinion for the majority of a three-judge 
district court in Abele v. Markle, which struck down Connecticut’s 
abortion law a few months before Roe was released.102 Judge Newman’s 
 
99 Steven B. Morse et al., Racial and Gender Differences in the Viability of Extremely 
Low Birth Weight Infants: A Population-Based Study, 117 PEDIATRICS 106, 110 (2006). 
100 See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, (discussing disparate impact claims 
targeting employment practices that “fall more harshly on one group than another and 
cannot be justified by business necessity") (quoting International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)); United States v. Fordice, 505 
U.S. 717, 735-36 (1992) (questioning educational justifications for admissions policies 
with racially disparate impact). 
101 Id. (citation omitted). 
102 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972). 
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argument for the viability standard proceeded in two steps, both of which 
are highly contestable. 
 
Judge Newman began by suggesting that a high level of societal consensus 
must exist before a state interest can count as “compelling”: 
 
The state interest advanced by this statute is critically 
different in nature than state interests that have been 
claimed, in other cases, to be sufficiently compelling to 
justify impairment of constitutional rights. A compelling 
state interest has generally been one where the nature of the 
interest was broadly accepted, with dispute remaining only 
as to whether the state could constitutionally advance that 
interest by the specific means being challenged. When 
Americans of Japanese descent were placed in relocation 
camps as a protection in the event of invasion, it was 
widely accepted that there was an important governmental 
interest in military security, even though it was a matter of 
sharp dispute whether that interest could justify an 
abridgement of constitutional rights based on a racial 
classification.103 
Judge Clarie’s dissent rejected the notion that societal consensus is 
necessary for a state interest to count as compelling: “diversity of 
viewpoint does not diminish state interest but often intensifies it. It is 
precisely for this reason that the weighing of conflicting values and 
viewpoints is a legislative, not a judicial, task.”104 
Even granting Judge Newman’s consensus test for the sake of argument, 
one can still maintain that Connecticut demonstrated a compelling state 
interest in support of its abortion law. Judge Newman’s principle called 
for societal consensus only at a high level of generality. In discussing the 
Japanese internment case, for instance, he recognized a broad consensus as 
to the general goal of “military security,” notwithstanding a vigorous 
debate over the “specific means” of placing Japanese-Americans in 
relocation camps. If the regulation at issue in Korematsu satisfies Judge 
Newman’s consensus test, then abortion regulations would seem to follow 
rather easily. No one would question the existence of a broad societal 
consensus in favor of state protection for innocent human life. The debate 
concerns only whether the state should pursue that interest through the 
“specific means” of regulating abortions. 
 
103 Id. at 15-16 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)). 
104 Id. at 33 (Clarie, J., dissenting). 
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In any event, Judge Newman’s consensus requirement seems difficult to 
reconcile with a case like Grutter v. Bollinger, which concerned 
affirmative action in law school admissions.105 In upholding the 
affirmative action program in that case, the Court accepted the state’s 
argument that it has a compelling interest in maintaining diversity in the 
law school’s student body.106 Clearly, this was a highly controversial 
proposition before the case was decided.107 Large segments of the public 
would deny that the government has any legitimate interest in maintaining 
diversity, much less that this interest counts as compelling. 
 
The second step in Judge Newman’s analysis was to suggest that a societal 
consensus in favor of protecting fetal life might not emerge until viability: 
 
Like the present statute, [a statute designed to prevent the 
destruction of fetuses after viability has been reached] 
would be conferring statutory rights on a fetus which does 
not have constitutional rights. However, the state interest in 
protecting the life of a fetus capable of living outside the 
uterus could be shown to be more generally accepted and, 
therefore, of more weight in the constitutional sense than 
the interest in preventing the abortion of a fetus that is not 
viable.108 
Judge Newman did not really claim—and certainly made no attempt to 
document—the proposition that a consensus in favor of protecting fetal 
life would form only at the point of viability. This is not surprising, given 
that this portion of the opinion was dicta, irrelevant to consideration of the 
Connecticut abortion statute before the court. In the absence of evidentiary 
support, however, Judge Newman’s suggestion of viability as the legally 
significant line represents little more than a judicial hunch, a guess about 
what Americans might think from someone with little basis to know. 
Unlike legislators, who have a stake in discerning the views of their 
constituents, we purposely shelter federal judges from the influence of 
public opinion.109 
105 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
106 Id. at 328-29. 
107 See, e.g., Douglass C. Lawrence, Challenging Affirmative Action: Does Diversity 
Justify Race-Conscious Admissions Programs?, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 83 (2002); 
Martin D. Carcieri, The Sixth Circuit and Grutter v. Bollinger: Diversity and Distortion,
7 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 127 (2002); see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Diversity Lie, 27 
HARV. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 385 (2003). 
108 Abele, 351 F. Supp. at 23. 
109 For this reason, the Constitution grants federal judges tenure during “good Behaviour” 
and protects their compensation against political manipulation. U.S. Const., art. III, § 1. 
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In applying its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has 
thought the best evidence of public consensus was provided by state 
legislative enactments. Thus, the Court has examined the laws of the states 
to discern whether a national consensus exists as to the propriety of 
executing certain categories of capital defendants.110 By that measure, 
Judge Newman’s hunch about the American consensus on fetal life seems 
clearly inaccurate. Employing viability as the controlling standard, the 
Supreme Court’s opinions in Roe and its companion case resulted in the 
invalidation of the abortion laws of nearly every state in the union.111 
Using the test employed in the capital punishment context, then, the pre-
Roe consensus favored protection of fetal life at a point prior to 
viability.112 Moreover, if one looks to international consensus, as the 
Supreme Court has sometimes done under the Eighth Amendment, it is 
telling that only a handful of countries permit abortion as late in pregnancy 
as viability.113 The viability standard was so aberrant at the time of Roe,
and remains so aberrant by international standards today, that, were it a 
rule governing executions, it would be in danger of invalidation as “cruel 
and unusual punishment” under the Court’s Eighth Amendment case law. 
D. The Woman’s Presumed Consent at Viability 
The joint opinion in Casey offered one other argument in favor of viability 
as the point at which states may seek to protect the life of the fetus. The 
plurality argued that the viability line has “an element of fairness,” 
because “[i]n some broad sense it might be said that a woman who fails to 
act before viability has consented to the State’s intervention on behalf of 
the developing child.”114 This dovetails with an argument made by Judge 
Newman in Abele, who wrote that a statute banning abortion after viability 
“would not be a direct abridgement of the woman’s constitutional right, 
but at most a limitation on the time when her right could be exercised.”115 
110 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-67 (2005) (finding “national consensus” 
against execution of juveniles); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002) (finding 
“national consensus” against execution of the mentally retarded). 
111 See PONNURU, supra note 61, at 11-13 (status of state abortion legislation prior to 
Roe) (quoting Russell Hittinger, Abortion Before Roe, FIRST THINGS, at 14-15 (Oct. 
1994)); id. at 17 (newspaper reports Roe will impact laws of 46 states) (quoting Warren 
Weaver, Jr., National Guidelines Set by 7-to-2 Vote, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 23, 1973)); 
see also id. at 13 n.7 (“A Harris poll asking whether abortion should be legal in the first 
four months of pregnancy came back 46 percent no, 42 percent yes in August 1972”). 
112 Because of Roe, state legislation on abortion no longer provides a reliable indication 
of public opinion. However, a recent analysis of the polling data finds it “undeniable that 
the public supports a legal regime that is far more protective of unborn life than we have 
now,” and “possible that [the public] narrowly supports a ban on most abortions.” 
PONNURU, supra note 61, at 205. 
113 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. 
114 Casey, 505 U.S. at 870. 
115 Abele, 351 F. Supp. at 24. 
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These arguments explain why a constitutional right to abortion should not 
extend farther than the point of viability. The Casey plurality recognized 
that when someone makes a decision as consequential as the decision to 
terminate a pregnancy, states have a legitimate interest in structuring the 
decisionmaking process to express respect for the life of the unborn.116 
States can adopt informed consent provisions, ensuring that the woman 
has been provided information relevant to the decision.117 They can also 
adopt waiting periods to promote careful consideration.118 By the same 
token, states have a legitimate interest in ensuring that the decision to 
terminate a pregnancy be made in a timely fashion. 
 
However, while the arguments in Casey and Abele show why a right to 
abortion should not extend farther than viability, they offer no explanation 
for extending the abortion right to such a late point in pregnancy. It could 
just as easily be said that a woman implicitly “consent[s] to state 
intervention on behalf of the developing child” if she fails to act within 
some shorter period that affords an opportunity to learn of the pregnancy. 
This too would be “at most a limitation on the time when her right could 
be exercised.” Thus, the argument from implied consent fails as a 
principled justification for selection of viability as the controlling legal 
standard. 
IV. Viability and Legitimate State Interests 
When the Supreme Court in Roe established a constitutional right to an 
abortion that extends to the point of fetal viability, it erected what remains 
one of the most permissive regimes of abortion on demand in the entire 
world.119 Just how permissive became apparent when the Supreme Court 
released Stenberg v. Carhart, a case that gave many people their first 
glimpse into the disturbing world of late-term abortions. Justice Kennedy, 
a member of the Casey plurality, dissented in Stenberg, believing Casey 
had done more to rein in the excesses of Roe and its progeny than the 
majority was willing to acknowledge.120 This article contends that, even if 
one believes in a constitutional right to an abortion, one need not support 
the extreme version of that right found in decisions like Stenberg. The 
 
116 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (“Regulations which do no more than create a structural 
mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express 
profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial 
obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right to choose.”). 
117 Id. at 881-85. 
118 Id. at 885-87. 
119 See supra notes 54-57; see also supra note 63. 
120 530 U.S. at 956-57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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Court could instead protect a right to abortion only in the “early stages” of 
pregnancy, as the Casey plurality suggested it was doing.121 
In my view, the arbitrariness of the viability standard provides a sufficient 
reason for its abandonment. In the subsections that follow, however, 
I offer additional grounds for ignoring Casey’s dicta about viability and 
instead reading the decision to permit state regulation of late-term 
abortions. Subsection A will discuss several of the opinions in Stenberg,
including Justice Kennedy’s somewhat graphic descriptions of late-term 
abortion procedures. Subsection B will argue that the Court should discard 
viability as the earliest point at which states can regulate to protect the life 
of the unborn. Alternatively, I will argue that the viability standard should 
be limited to the state interest in fetal life, and should not apply when the 
state regulates to promote the distinct state interests identified in Justice 
Kennedy’s Stenberg dissent, including interests in erecting a barrier 
against infanticide and maintaining public respect for the medical 
profession. 
A. Stenberg v. Carhart and Late-Term Abortions 
In Stenberg v. Carhart, a narrow 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court struck 
down Nebraska’s ban on partial birth abortions, also known as dilation and 
extraction (D&X) abortions. The Court offered two reasons for the 
decision. First, rejecting evidence that the D&X procedure is never 
medically indicated, the majority found the ban on D&X abortions 
impermissible because it failed to include an exception for the “health” of 
the mother.122 Second, the Court concluded that, notwithstanding the 
construction of the statute by Nebraska’s attorney general, the legislation 
could be read to also prohibit a different procedure, the dilation and 
evacuation (D&E) abortion, which is more commonly used to terminate 
second trimester pregnancies.123 
Some of the more intriguing opinions in Stenberg were the concurrences 
and dissents. Of particular interest was Justice Kennedy’s dissenting 
opinion, given that he was a member of the plurality that reaffirmed a 
constitutional right to abortion in Casey. Justice Kennedy concluded that 
the majority had failed to properly apply Casey in invalidating the 
Nebraska statute.124 
121 Id. at 844; cf. id. at 850 (“Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we 
suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual implications 
of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage.”). 
122 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930-38. 
123 Id. at 938-46. 
124 Id. at 956-57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“a central premise [of Casey] was that the 
States retain a critical and legitimate role in legislating on the subject of abortion, as 
limited by the woman's right”); id. at 964 (“Demonstrating a further and basic 
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Reviewing the trial transcript, Justice Kennedy described the two abortion 
methods at issue in the case. He began with the D&E abortion, which 
Nebraska claimed it was not seeking to ban: 
 
As described by Dr. Carhart, the D&E procedure requires 
the abortionist to use instruments to grasp a portion (such 
as a foot or hand) of a developed and living fetus and drag 
the grasped portion out of the uterus into the vagina. Dr. 
Carhart uses the traction created by the opening between 
the uterus and vagina to dismember the fetus, tearing the 
grasped portion away from the remainder of the body. . . . 
The fetus, in many cases, dies just as a human adult or child 
would: It bleeds to death as it is torn limb from limb. The 
fetus can be alive at the beginning of the dismemberment 
process and can survive for a time while its limbs are being 
torn off. . . . . Dr. Carhart has observed fetal heartbeat via 
ultrasound with “extensive parts of the fetus removed,” and 
testified that mere dismemberment of a limb does not 
always cause death because he knows of a physician who 
removed the arm of a fetus only to have the fetus go on to 
be born “as a living child with one arm.” At the conclusion 
of a D&E abortion no intact fetus remains. In Dr. Carhart’s 
words, the abortionist is left with “a tray full of pieces.”125 
The second form of abortion at issue in Stenberg, the D&X procedure, was 
the one Nebraska claimed to prohibit by its statute: 
 
The other procedure implicated today is called “partial birth 
abortion” or the D&X. . . . In the D&X, the abortionist 
initiates the woman’s natural delivery process by causing 
the cervix of the woman to be dilated, sometimes over a 
sequence of days. The fetus’ arms and legs are delivered 
outside the uterus while the fetus is alive; witnesses to the 
procedure report seeing the body of the fetus moving 
outside the woman’s body. At this point, the abortion 
procedure has the appearance of a live birth. . . . With only 
the head of the fetus remaining in utero, the abortionist 
tears open the skull. According to Dr. Martin Haskell, a 
leading proponent of the procedure, the appropriate 
instrument to be used at this stage of the abortion is a pair 
 
misunderstanding of Casey, the Court holds the ban on the D & X procedure fails 
because it does not include an exception permitting an abortionist to perform a D & X 
whenever he believes it will best preserve the health of the woman.”). 
125 530 U.S. at 958-59 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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of scissors. Witnesses report observing the portion of the 
fetus outside the woman react to the skull penetration. The 
abortionist then inserts a suction tube and vacuums out the 
developing brain and other matter found within the 
skull. . . . Brain death does not occur until after the skull 
invasion, and, according to Dr. Carhart, the heart of the 
fetus may continue to beat for minutes after the contents of 
the skull are vacuumed out. The abortionist next completes 
the delivery of a dead fetus, intact except for the damage to 
the head and the missing contents of the skull.126 
Justice Kennedy recognized that both procedures would be objectionable 
to those who recognize the humanity of the fetus.127 Nevertheless, he 
contended that “D&X’s stronger resemblance to infanticide means 
Nebraska could conclude the procedure presents a greater risk of 
disrespect for life and a consequent greater risk to the profession and 
society, which depend for their sustenance upon reciprocal recognition of 
dignity and respect.”128 
Explicitly rejecting the distinction Justice Kennedy and the other 
dissenters found between the two methods of late-term abortion, Justices 
Stevens and Ginsburg could see no valid reason to ban one and not the 
other. According to Justice Stevens: 
 
Although much ink is spilled today describing the 
gruesome nature of late-term abortion procedures, that 
rhetoric does not provide me a reason to believe that the 
procedure Nebraska here claims it seeks to ban is more 
brutal, more gruesome, or less respectful of ‘potential life’ 
than the equally gruesome procedure Nebraska claims it 
still allows.129 
Justice Ginsburg agreed: “[A]s Justice Stevens points out, the most 
common method of performing previability second trimester abortions is 
no less distressing or susceptible to gruesome description.”130 The position 
of Justices Stevens and Ginsburg effectively puts states disturbed by 
partial birth abortions into a sort of Catch 22. An attempt to ban both 
 
126 Id. at 959 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
127 Id. at 963 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Those who oppose abortion would agree, indeed 
would insist, that both procedures are subject to the most severe moral condemnation, 
condemnation reserved for the most repulsive human conduct.”). 
128 Id. at 963 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
129 Id. at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
130 Id. at 951 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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D&X and D&E abortions at any point prior to viability would run afoul of 
Roe’s insistence that the right to abortion continues until the fetus is 
viable. On the other hand, an attempt to ban just one procedure, and leave 
the other in place, would be invalid because both are equally repulsive. 
B. Viability and Late-Term Abortion Regulations 
I have no strong opinion as to whether one can sensibly distinguish 
between D&E and D&X abortions. As I see it, Justices Stevens and 
Ginsburg were right to describe both procedures as “gruesome.”131 
However, the conclusion I draw from that observation differs from theirs. 
In my view, the fact that it is difficult to read about late-term methods of 
abortion without a shudder shows that the Supreme Court was wrong to 
conclude that the Constitution protects a right to abortion extending to the 
point of viability. If the Court is going to recognize a constitutional right 
to abortion, the states should at least have authority to ask that the decision 
be made early in pregnancy, before D&E and D&X become the only 
available options. To my mind, this provides an additional reason for the 
Court to discard the viability standard, just as it threw out the equally 
arbitrary trimester framework in Casey.132 
Alternatively, the Court should limit application of the viability standard 
to the context in which it was developed. The Court in Roe recognized 
only two state interests that might justify regulation of abortion—
preserving the health of the mother and protecting the life of the fetus.133 
The Court adopted the viability rule as a limitation on the latter interest, 
which the State of Texas had sought to protect from the point of 
conception onward.134 Justice Kennedy in Stenberg advocated a broader 
recognition of permissible state interests, finding it “inappropriate for the 
Judicial Branch to provide an exhaustive list of state interests implicated 
by abortion.”135 He thought Casey “premised on the States having an 
important constitutional role in defining their interests in the abortion 
debate.”136 
131 Id. at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 951 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
132 Indeed, the two are closely related. The viability rule provided the rationale for 
distinguishing between second and third trimester abortions. See supra note 52. 
133 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 (“the State does have an important and legitimate interest in 
preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman, whether she be a resident of 
the State or a non-resident who seeks medical consultation and treatment there, and that it 
has still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human 
life”). 
134 Id. at 159, 163. 
135 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 877). 
136 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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Nebraska asserted that its ban on partial birth abortion was supported by a 
state interest in “erecting a barrier to infanticide.”137 Justice Kennedy 
described this interest in the following terms: 
 
States also have an interest in forbidding medical 
procedures which, in the State’s reasonable determination, 
might cause the medical profession or society as a whole to 
become insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including life 
in the human fetus.138 
He also thought Nebraska asserted a legitimate interest in “preserving the 
integrity of the medical profession”139:
A State may take measures to ensure the medical 
profession and its members are viewed as healers, sustained 
by a compassionate and rigorous ethic and cognizant of the 
dignity and value of human life, even life which cannot 
survive without the assistance of others.140 
In Justice Kennedy’s view, these interests supported Nebraska’s ban on 
D&X abortions.141 But those same state interests would also support 
regulation of D&E abortions. Whether or not one may rationally 
distinguish between the procedures, both have the capacity to desensitize 
people to the taking of human life and to undermine public confidence in 
the medical profession. 
 
Fetal viability bears only a tangential relationship to the strength of these 
distinct state interests, which concern the impact of certain abortion 
procedures on attitudes held by the public and by medical personnel. 
Undoubtedly, some people believe that a fetus becomes a human being 
only at the point of viability or afterwards. Abortion of pre-viable fetuses 
may have no impact on views held by such people regarding the value of 
human life or their respect for members of the medical profession. But as 
the Court has recognized, much of the public believes a fetus is a human 
being well before the point of viability.142 The widespread availability of 
 
137 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Petitioners 48-
49). 
138 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 961-62 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 852). 
139 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Petitioners 48-
49). 
140 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 962 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
141 Id. at 960-64 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
142 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 920 (“Millions of Americans believe that life begins at 
conception and consequently that an abortion is akin to causing the death of an innocent 
child.”). 
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sonograms, through which millions of people see pre-viable fetuses with 
heads, eyes, fingers and other features characteristic of adult humans, will 
no doubt contribute to this phenomenon.143 
For someone who recognizes humanity in the fetus, knowledge that tens of 
thousands of pre-viable fetuses are destroyed by D&E and D&X abortions 
could lead to a loss of confidence in the medical profession which carries 
out these procedures. Alternatively, since the law is a teacher, some who 
see the pre-viable fetus as human (including some doctors and nurses) 
may become gradually more accepting of the destruction of innocent 
humans as an unpleasant but “necessary” evil. The viability standard was 
developed to measure the strength of a different state interest, the interest 
in preserving the lives of individual fetuses subject to abortion. It should 
not be applied as a barrier to the pursuit of the legitimate state interests in 
dealing with the adverse societal impacts of late-term abortions. 
V. Conclusion 
At the outset of the article, I quoted the acknowledgement by the Casey 
plurality of an obligation to “justify the lines we draw.”144 The corollary 
would seem to be an obligation to eschew lines that defy principled 
justification. In the decades since Roe, the Court has offered no adequate 
rationale for the viability standard, notwithstanding persistent judicial and 
academic critiques. Exacerbating this country’s divisions over abortion 
and placing us out of step with the world community, the viability rule 
seems a strong candidate for abandonment as the Court continues to 
rethink its abortion jurisprudence in the aftermath of Casey.
143 See PONNURU, supra note 61, at 207-08. See also Hope, supra note 70, at 208 (“At 
twenty weeks of development the fetus is outwardly indistinguishable from a premature 
human infant. It has well developed facial features, arms and legs, hands and feet, fingers 
and toes, fingernails and fingerprints.”). 
144 Casey, 505 U.S. at 870. 
